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This article is the third of four1 written to line up two extremes in the history of methodology: 
early 20th century Pragmatism and late-Renaissance militarism, filling in the middle period, 
focusing on Voltaire and the atmosphere before the French revolution. Pragmatist William James 
pretended to offer a purely formal method, yet strategized it as a doctrinal attack on the inefficiency 
of Christianity (according to his (mis)understanding of it). Machiavelli attacked Christianity’s 
practice of justice and meekness as weakness, from his own Classicist, Romanist militaristic empire 
perspective. Voltaire, in middle Modernity, devised a hermeneutic from an Enlightenment position 
with a strong Neo-Classicist slant, by representing Ancient Classical tradition as fundamentally 
tolerant to difference of opinion, and by over-painting any suggestion that early Christians were 
persecuted for their faith. He represented the Christians of his own days (often rightly so) as unfair, 
criminal and violent, especially with regard to heterodox opinions. His naturalistic tendencies, 
contradicting his liberalism (an intolerant propagation of tolerance) must have contributed to the 
severity of persecution of non-compliant Christians during the 1789 Revolution. Later naturalistic 
liberalists, such as Dide and Booms, and several anti-Christian sites on the internet, found and find 
their inspiration (sometimes against his intentions) in Voltaire’s criticism of Christianity. 
Keywords: Apologetics, tolerance, Neo-Classicism, Vico, book, hermeneutics, practicalism, 
Nature, Reason, statism, peace
Hierdie artikel is die derde van vier, geskryf vanuit twee historiese ekstreme: vroeg-20e-eeuse 
Pragmatisme en laat-Renaissance militarisme. Dit vul die middelperiode in met artikels gefokus 
op Voltaire en die wysgerige konteks voor die Franse Rewolusie. Pragmatis William James het die 
pretensie van ‘n suiwer formele metode voorgehou, maar dit strategies ingevul as ‘n doktrinêre aanval 
op die oneffektiwiteit van die Christendom (volgens sy eie (wan-)verstaan daarvan). Machiavelli het 
die Christendom se beoefening van geregtigheid en sagmoedigheid as swakheid aangeval, uit sy 
eie Klassistiese, Romanistiese, militaristiese ryksperspektief. Voltaire, in middel-Moderniteit, het ‘n 
hermeneutiek uit ‘n Verligtingsperspektief ontwerp, sterk Neo-Klassisisties, deur die Antieke Klassieke 
tradisie as fundamenteel tolerant teenoor meningsverskil voor te stel en deur enige suggestie dat vroeë 
Christene oor hulle geloof vervolg is, toe te smeer. Tegelykertyd het hy die Christene van sy tyd (dikwels 
tereg) voorgestel as onregverdig, krimineel en gewelddadig, veral teenoor afwykende menings. Sy 
naturalistiese neigings, wat sy liberalisme weerspreek (‘n intolerante propagering van toleransie), 
moes bygedra het tot die skrikwekkende vervolging van oninskiklike Christene gedurende die 1789 
Rewolusie. Latere naturalistiese liberaliste, soos Dide en Booms en verskeie anti-Christelike blaaie op 
die internet, het hulle inspirasie gevind (soms teen sy intensie) in Voltaire se kritiek op die Christendom.
Sleutelwoorde: Apologetiek, toleransie/verdraagsaamheid, Neo-Klassisisme, Vico, boek, 
hermeneutiek, praktikalisme, Natuur, Rede, statisme, vrede
1  Venter JJ (Ponti), 2013a. Methodologies of targeting – Renaissance militarism attacking Christianity as weakness. 
Koers 78(2), doi: 10.4102/koers.vt8i2.62. http://koersjournal.org.za/index.php/koers/article/view/62 [There are 
no keywords in the articles themselves but the following terms may be helpful: Classicist, hermeneutic, heroic, 
exemplar, imperialist, Roman, competitiveness, balance of powers] 
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1 THE PROJECT 
Voltaire, famous French Enlightenment philosophe and literary 
writer during the decades before the French Revolution, was 
quite vicious in his attacks on Christianity. According to him, 
Christians had been the most barbarous warmongers and 
killers, attacking people for no other reason than difference of 
opinion. They were but the heirs of Jewish barbarism. 
1.1 Continuity in discontinuity
There are two sides to Voltaire’s attack upon Christendom: 
interconnected but clearly distinguishable: his prejudicial 
reading of history and his admiration for recent scientific 
discoveries, especially the work of Newton. I shall focus on his 
historical hermeneutic first. Both sides of Voltaire’s thought, 
like that of his contemporaries, are rooted in the Classical era, 
well-cooked into a Modern broth. The activities of different 
secret societies indicate a tendency to Ancient paganism in 
a vulgarized form. Voltaire and Sade shared this environment. 
This article is the third in a series that can be described as 
presuppositional apologetics. The articles have grown out of 
a broader study of scholarly methodology. From a historical 
point of view, having studied a Renaissance thinker 
(Machiavelli) and a late Modern thinker (William James), one 
somehow ‘connects’ the lines, by also analysing a middle Modern 
(Enlightenment) thinker, using intermittent synchronic cuts to show 
the diachronic persistence of ideas, but also the shifts. The French 
Revolution of 1789 and its preparatory philosophes are known to 
have been anti-Christian, especially anti-Catholic. Among them 
Voltaire was a moderate, known for his tolerance - especially 
his struggle for freedom of opinion and expression. 
Voltaire’s methodology is very important, given his self-
centred adoration of Newton’s physics and method and the elite 
position he awarded himself in relation to a deified Newton. 
A further contributing factor here was Classicism’s influence 
on methodology in the Renaissance (Machiavelli) and Neo-
Classicism’s during the Enlightenment; Neo-Classicism was 
an adaptation of Classicism; a Modernization of Renaissance 
Classicist cues. Voltaire’s influence is still strong; one has but 
to Google ‘Voltaire’: large numbers of especially anti-Christian 
quotes from his works appear.
1.2  Relativism combined with formalism in  
 Pragmatist emptiness
I am trying to specifically analyse today’s strange tension 
between post-modern relativism and the absolutizing of 
form; that is, technical method. The absolutizing of technical 
method can be understood from the fact that our lives are 
largely embedded in technology, with its digitized format as 
the summit. Post-modern relativism does not totally reject 
formalism; one still needs normative standards for rating 
students, promoting members of staff, rating the standing of 
a company or a government department. The calculator 
becomes the judge and standard. Bureaucracy rules; the 
accountant is judge supreme. That is: based upon the belief 
that formal procedures are pure forms: they (supposedly) do not 
commit the judge to any belief whatsoever; prejudices are all 
eliminated by the packaging. In these articles I have attempted 
to question the ontological, ideological, cultural and religious 
neutrality of the formal sides of method. Since there are 
different forms, each form itself – as a particular form - must 
have a distinctive content. Heidegger says that Modernity is 
shackled by method-idolatry. Post-Modernism – even the work 
of the methodological anarchist, Feyerabend2 – safeguards its 
doctrinal relativism by adhering to form, thus remaining very 
‘Modern’. 
Modern thinkers had a tendency (since Bacon and Machiavelli 
in the Renaissance) to ‘certify’ their doctrines by showing them 
to be the necessary result of a new, supreme method. James 
did so too: his way of illustrating the power of his method by 
attacking Christianity was part of this heritage. It somehow 
was the Modern remnant of the struggle between church and 
state and between scholarship and religion at large. One finds 
this in Machiavelli, Hobbes, in Kant, in Saint-Simon and Comte, 
in Marx – too many to name. This in itself shows a prejudice 
created by the continuous secularizing of Western humankind, 
based on the Modern belief in the “super-natural” abilities of 
humankind.
Secularising is of the essence here. There were opposing 
reasons for the attacks on Christianity. James viewed 
Christianity as simply too inefficient to give expression to and 
act on its own beliefs. But Machiavelli accused good Christians 
– using a method expressly designed to show a better way – as a 
hindrance to efficient policies: kindness, neighbourliness 
and justice do not work in politics (cf. further Machiavelli, 
Discorsi II, ii, 6 ff). In this he pre-empted Nietzsche (cf. 
Nietzsche: Zarathustra I: Vom Krieg und Kriegsvolke; 1930: 48ff). 
A peculiarity worth studying thus showed itself along the way: 
contradictory assessments of what is wrong with Christianity. This 
has a methodological basis that in turn is given direction by a world 
view. 
William James viewed Christianity as a lost case – for all its 
pretence, it had not done any good in two thousand years. 
James’ explicit aim was the establishment of a workable world 
view through his ‘empty’ method. Machiavelli recognized some 
good in Christianity, but this exactly is its weak spot, compared 
to Ancient blood-and-gore religions. Machiavelli was driven by 
a pagan militarism, based upon the Roman Empire ideal, and 
founded upon the deterministic pendulum cycle of history 
(cf. Venter, 2013c: 12ff).
1.3  Voltaire versus James and Machiavelli
Voltaire, however, was a man for freedom and free thought. 
His attack on Christianity was neither based on its goodness 
nor on its inefficiency, but exactly on its criminal aspects. 
On reading his analyses of Biblical narratives, it becomes 
clear that he, too, criticized from the perspective of ‘nature’, 
2 Feyerabend’s work, Against method (1979), is not some 
habracadabragoogeldygoo – it is formally structured in a logical way 
in paragraphs, chapters, arguing a point and thus contradicting in 
formal practice what he argues as doctrinal content. 
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‘science’, and ‘reason’. The overlaps in ontological terminology 
- delivering contradictory results - indicate that methods are 
never purely empty and purely disinterested with regard to world 
view perspectives; also that world views’ basic ideas do not 
completely overlap. It is thus important, reading backwards 
from the technical level, to enact some transcendental criticism 
to uncover the presuppositions in the undercarriage of the 
techniques. 
From my own point of view, as an analyst, this required 
a loosening-up of my own categorical system in order to allow 
for the widest possible range. Only in this way can one see 
the reductionist attitude of Modern writers, who tended to 
hark back to Ancient oppositional categories, exactly in order 
to move away from Christian ideas. Thus the Christian agape 
was reduced to Ancient eros (sensual desire) – clearly already in 
Machiavelli and Hobbes, and expressly so in Feuerbach, Marx 
and Engels (cf. Marx & Engels, 2014). This was also the case in 
Voltaire (cf. DPP, s v amitié; amour). 
1.4  The Neo-Classicist moments
Neo-Classicism contributed to more than only a secularizing 
of culture; in many respects it propagated a return to Ancient 
pagan ideas. Methodologically, it tended to say: 
• Look how nice the Ancient intellectuals were, and how 
bad, untrustworthy, inefficient or criminal the Christian 
leaders are. My method shows you the better alternative.
• As Modern discourse matured, the Classical references 
were suppressed, but the ’idea’-logical tradition was 
sustained. A second important proposition – to be 
demonstrated here in the case of Voltaire – can be drawn: 
• Methods and techniques are developed with aims in 
mind; aims imply norms and criteria. Methods may become 
techniques applicable in more situations than only those 
for which they have specifically been developed. But the 
burden of their original aims and the criteria behind these 
will move around with them. The form itself has content and 
this content is a doctrine.
Voltaire developed a method that had a normative base in 
Neo-Classicism, was aimed at being a critique of Christianity, 
not objective and wilfully prejudiced, Classicist in a normative 
sense: opposing the virtues of the Classical era to the crimes of 
Christianity. Form and content are fused by aims and criteria. 
Historically the acceptable sides of his thought received 
more attention; much less has been written about the ‘less 
holy’ aspects. The selective intolerance of a man known for 
preaching tolerance itself was embedded in the way he read 
the Classical Roman era. The sustained naturalistic, anti-
Christian, Neo-Classicist structure of Voltaire’s critique 
allowed others to radicalize his moderate liberal thought. 
 
 
2 CHRISTIAN CRIMES AND ANTI-
CHRISTIAN PROPAGANDA
Some pre-Revolutionary philosophes were socialists (such 
as Rousseau); others were liberalists, among these Voltaire. 
Both criticised Christianity; each from own perspective. 
Voltaire’s more liberal critique was followed up in a moderate 
way by Kant; but some later liberals were quite fervent. The 
relevance of Voltaire can be seen in for example the extremist 
attacks by Auguste Dide at the beginning of the 20th century, but 
also still today by so many Voltaire excerpts, quoted (viciously) 
out of context. Auguste Dide, in a pre-preface to his work, 
The Christian legend (1914) summarized the crimes of Christianity 
against ‘free thought’ - ‘free’ being a normative adjective. The 
content of his arguments shows a contradiction of this norm. 
2.1  The post-Voltaire case against Christianity
With a broad paintbrush and in broad strokes, Dide reminds us 
of the crimes the Catholic Church committed against heterodox 
scholars; of the Lutherans against the Anabaptists and the 
farmers; of the Enlightened Empress of Russia, Catherine the 
Great, being a Russian Orthodox monarch, for making laws 
against philosophy and Roman Catholicism; of Calvinism and 
John Calvin’s responsibility for the execution of Servet and 
the doctrine of absolute servility to the state. Even Rousseau’s 
utopian Masonic civil religion, requiring capital punishment 
for retracting one’s acceptance of the state’s civil religion, and 
the bloody terroristic execution of this doctrine by Robespierre, 
are blamed on Calvinism. Religion’s instruments of power and 
its abuses are noted – and surely outrages happened:
[1] For sure, if ever religions have been armed against resistance 
and dominance, then it was the Christian Church. During the 
fifteen centuries they had at their disposal, the decisions to 
ban, the forfeiture and capital punishment, the extraordinary 
courts, the prisons, the cellar jails, torture in all forms, and 
cruelties, the scaffold and the stake … (Dide, 1914:3).
2.2  The case against religion and against God
There is an alternative, though, in the words of Dide’s Dutch 
translator, Booms: 
[2] …that the readers will replace the meaningless believing 
without any proof with knowledge, or at least will make attempts 
to know by studying the Laws of Nature, the only true governor 
of the universe, and then according to the unchangeable and 
untouchable self-posed Laws of Cause and Effect, that have 
always existed, will exist in infinity, and which also exclude any 
divine intervention. 
There is no God, no heaven, no hell; there is only Nature, 
unchangeably working according to cause and effect, creating, 
destroying, recreating, knowing no death, for what we call the end 
of life, is the transition to new action, to the generation of new life, 
the recreation, in eternal endless repetition (Booms, 1914: 13).
Dide believed in a purely physical universe. Turgot had already 
indicated the endless cycle of nature, but he retained a linear 
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course for human history. Booms’ naturalistic faith determines 
the totality of his approach to the world: one needs scientific 
knowledge to live and scientific knowledge is limited to 
knowing cause and effect and their ‘self-imposed’ laws. Note 
that Dide, right from the outset, begins to use the language 
of philosophical ‘theology’: ‘self-posed Laws’, ‘unchangeable’, 
‘creating’, ‘knowing no death’ all the characteristics ascribed 
to ‘god’ by the Ancient Greeks and Medieval natural 
theologians. An important consequence of Modern subjectivist 
rationalism and the Modern interpretation of natural law 
is that the rational subject, the object, the divine, and 
nature had all imploded into but LAW by the time of Comte. 
These divine characteristics of ‘natural law’ cannot be 
derived from the facts of Physics, even though Mach and 
Einstein also believed in them. But Einstein expressly says: 
they are part of a presupposed world view. Given the power 
of this abstract Modern person baptized ‘Science’ and the 
magic of an expression like ‘science says’, Modern Naturalism 
always found it quite easy to propagate a divine physicalist law.
Yet blaming the Catholics, the Protestants, the Russian 
Orthodox, in fact all Christians, for atrocities, requires more 
than a purely physicalist world view. It requires moral criteria - 
Dide shouts them from the ‘roof’:
[3] There is no God!!... There can be no God!!...
Only Nature governs the universe and Nature continues her work 
without adoration or being-flattered; it shows humankind and all 
that exists the road to mutual utility and mutual support. 
This is the morality of Nature!!! It does not want any adoration for it 
does not give any favours and knows no mercy and no compassion; 
it works according to rules of cause and effect established by the 
necessity for all eternity!! (Dide, 1914: 284 – his italics).
Note the italics, exclamation marks, the capitals. In the preface 
it is explicitly stated that Dide’s work was a piece of responsible 
science, good for the propaganda campaign of free thinking. 
Voltaire himself was not an atheist: he rather espoused 
a panto-deism in which the divine was collapsed into the laws 
of nature, as is clear from his poem: Le desastre de Lisbon (1756). 
But this kind of panto-deism operates with a paralysed god; in 
practice ‘nature’ governs. Dide-and-Booms may have stretched 
Voltaire’s ideas, but these ideas are implicit in much of what he 
stood for. Being propagandists, they followed him in his totally 
skewed representation of history: Robespierre, Nietzsche, and 
Modern patriotism surely had secular roots. 
2.3  Whatever happened to free thought?
Booms, Dide’s translator, describes himself on the title 
page as ‘Vice-President of the International Propaganda 
Committee for the Application of Morality based on the Laws of 
Nature’. This is an almost mystical naturalistic metaphysics: 
‘Nature’ appears as an active ‘person’ operating in terms of the 
laws of cause and effect – exactly what Auguste Comte rejected 
as (out-progressed) ‘metaphysics’ (Comte, 1852, preface). 
Booms and Dide knew for ‘sure’ that ‘Nature’ was in control; 
and also for how long: from all eternity to all eternity. 
They made a double claim: 
(a) their view is good science and 
(b) it provides the right propaganda for free thought. 
Propaganda it clearly is – but science? They knew for sure that 
in all history of humankind, the Christians alone have had the 
instruments of power to commit such atrocities. But how to 
know all this for sure? For sure - quite Modern - they stood in a 
divine Archimedean point, providing an overview over all of 
history - from somewhere in the eternal past to -somewhere in 
the eternal future.
The consequences of Dide’s view: ‘Nature’ unavoidably 
(causally) teaches us – i.e. unwittingly coerces us into - ‘utility’ 
and ‘mutual support’. Thus ‘Nature’ puts some people in power; 
they cannot – in mutuality - be but as merciless as ‘Nature’ itself! 
(Reductio ad absurdum). Perplexing: Christianity is blamed for 
the way in which merciless Nature deterministically controlled 
Christianity for everybody’s advantage. When the scholarly 
charge sheet is an anti-Christian propaganda sheet, calling the 
‘other’ utterly stupid, fraudulent, hypocritical, the claim of good 
scholarship fades away; fairness in weighing the evidence too. 
3 VOLTAIRE AND DIDE-&-BOOMS
The authors of The Christian legend took their cue from Voltaire 
as pre-Revolutionary French satirist. He did find Christians – 
especially Catholics, in particular the Jesuits – to be fraudulent, 
hypocritical and murderous. 
3.1 ‘From and through and to … nature’? 
And humanity then? Like Dide-&-Booms, Voltaire approached 
issues from the ‘natural’ side. ‘Natural’, here, means Modernity’s 
‘natural’: the mechanical, the biotic, the sensual, the emotional - 
that is: all the sub-rational functions (with an ambiguity: the 
Medieval creational ‘natural’ alloyed in). This made it difficult 
for Voltaire to find a distinctive characteristic for the human 
being. The clearest examples of this are his inscriptions on 
‘love’ and ‘pederasty’ in the Dictionnaire … (1765; s v Amour, 
Pédérastie) and his sensualist struggles at the beginning of the 
Traite de metaphysique (TM, 1734: par I-II). 
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PLATE A: Cover page of Dide’s work.
The Cartesian ambiguous belief in scientific control of nature 
(while being controlled by nature) was shared between 
Voltaire and Dide-&-Booms (cf. Descartes, 1969:143 ff).There 
was, however, also a serious difference between Voltaire 
(and before him, Vico) on the one hand and Dide-&-Booms 
on the other: Voltaire wrote during the early Enlightenment 
period: science to him was the light that could bring control 
over the phenomena of nature. Giambattista Vico (1668-
1744) distinguished quite clearly between ‘nature’ as the 
socio-practical (rational) and ‘nature’ as the sub-rational. 
Voltaire does not refer to Vico, but Vico was in the air (read 
for example Turgot and Comte). In an unsystematic and more 
naturalistic way, Voltaire still attempted to work with Vico’s 
distinction. Being an Enlightenment Humanist Voltaire 
focused on the practicalities of the relationship between 
thought and external reality, but his naturalistic base constantly 
interned him in the Newtonian model of natural science 
(cf. PLATE B below). 
Led by this model he developed a scholarly method to target 
Christianity, following a road very similar, yet also dissimilar, 
to that of Machiavelli (cf. Venter, 2013c). Voltaire highlighted 
the goodness of the Ancient Classical people versus the badness 
of contemporary Christians; Machiavelli praised the (morally 
doubtful) military strategies of the Ancient people and 
highlighted the badness of the goody-two-shoes Christians of 
his days. 
The International Propaganda Committee for the Application of 
Morality based upon the Laws of Nature, belonged to the late-
Enlightenment overlapping with early Irrationalism: their 
logo still shows the torch of univers-al knowledge reaching to 
the globe and the Zodiac (as a physical universal), above the 
broken stone tables of the ten commandments. A living natural 
foundation constantly transforming itself is symbolized by the 
butterfly below (see Plate A). 
The enigma of organic vis-à-vis the inorganic recurrently 
seems to create havoc for materialists. Is life in matter 
or does the inorganic create the organic? (J.C. Smuts, a 
contemporary of translator Booms, would argue that organised 
wholes allow higher level organised wholes to come forth 
(cf. Smuts, 1929: 1932). 
Materialists want us all to subject ourselves to the merciless 
laws of nature, and be ‘useful’ to and ‘supportive’ of one another. 
But how to understand what this living-dead, Nature, wants 
from us? Reading Plate A from below, one has the impression 
– something often conversational among ‘objectivist’ scientists 
– that Nature ‘speaks’: it almost automatically creates the light 
of scientific knowledge in and for us – breaking through and 
shattering the stone table of the Ten Commandments. But why 
exert yourself to understand that speech, if one is merely an object of 
nature’s laws? 
3.2  Masters of the universe?
There is something special about the frequent appearance 
of the Zodiac in pictures like these – it presupposes a hidden 
Archimedean point and expresses the Modern motif of mastery – 
human masters of the universe. 
Note the Zodiac’s position in Plates B (Voltaire) and C (Vico). 
PLATE B: Voltaire: Frontispiece
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- In C Maiden Metaphysics is standing on the Zodiac, with all the 
religious, natural and cultural symbols below her feet. Vico was 
an ‘Alexandrine Patristic’ (working from mystical metaphysical 
insight to the divine archetypes for culture and civil society), 
yet also Modern in the form of his belief in human control: a 
rational control of the universe. But he distinguished clearly 
between control of the physical and of the social.
- Plate B was published just a little later than C; it is located 
in physical nature, showing the scientist Newton in a divine 
position, controlling by measuring. 
- Plate A still uses the Zodiac as Parmenidean Anangkê 
(Necessity) binding the universe, but even though its naturalistic 
propaganda is more fervent, the belief in a total human control 
of nature (Descartes) seems to have subsided somewhat: Dame 
Nature had become quite bossy. 
- However, in all three cases there seems to be a hidden 
Archimedean point that provides this univers-al overview, 
presenting the ‘universal’ as mechanical or as bio-physical-
wholeness. Vico appears to have followed the Cartesian cue 
of pulleying God into reason, thus giving science a divine, 
revelatory character. In Voltaire (and Dide-&-Booms) the 
suggestion of science as revelatory – the Greek Parmenidean 
idea of ‘being’ as ‘uncovered-truth’ - has been maintained, but 
the dependence on a transcendent (as acknowledged by Vico), 
has disappeared. Or, stated differently, divine truth is ‘nature’ 
and ‘nature’ is revealed in and by scientific reason (and mastered 
by reason) as the humanistic supernatural. In the Biblical idea 
of truth, the dependence on and the trustworthiness of God are 
upfront; thus creational revelation is actually but a medium 
(although in Platonist Christians such as Vico it directly 
expresses the archetypes) (cf. further also Paul’s Letter to the 
Romans, chapter 1). 
PLATE C: Vico’s symbolic page
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Plate B is the frontispiece in Voltaire’s Elements die philosophie 
de Neuton; check Plate C that of Vico’s Scienca nuova. Plate 
C appeared about 25 years before Plate B. In Plate B Newton 
is seen measuring the globe. Emily du Chatelet, Voltaire’s 
life companion, represented as a Muse reflecting the divine 
light, and Voltaire in Caesarist habit the announcing scientist 
below. In Vico, the divine providential eye as the Platonist 
light source, casts its light via dame Metaphysics onto Ancient 
history (Homeros) – the source of social natural law, while she 
is standing on the universe (the source of physical natural law).
As in so many Irrationalistic 20th-century thinkers, the 
‘humanism’ of Dide-&-Booms was but fingertips hooked onto 
a rock above the precipice of nature (whoever the person, 
‘Nature’, may be). They became Hobbesians without the latter’s 
controlling raison de l’ état; for reason (including justice and 
mutuality through exchange) supposedly either mechanically 
cared for itself (read the economists) or had already gone to the 
grave in Nietzsche. Even the supernatural-from-the-natural, 
the Nietzschean Übermensch (with its Cartesian and Kantian 
predecessors), had its head knocked back into the natural neck. 
They do what according to Feyerabend ‘all’ scientists were doing 
anyway: play propagandistic power games (cf. Feyerabend, 
1975: ch. 1). 
4 VOLTAIRE: A METHOD OF TARGETING 
THE ‘INFAMOUS’
[4] You fear books, as certain small cantons fear violins. Let us 
read and let us dance – these two amusements will never do any 
harm to the world (1764: 1-2).
Thus sayeth Voltaire (1694-1778) to the princes, and particularly 
the Catholic Church of France, in his essay on Liberty of the press 
(1764). The light-hearted style – almost Nietzschean - of the 
quote may mislead us about the very serious intentions, taking 
issue with the coalition between Church hierarchy and nobility, 
but especially with the former. They would easily commit 
judicial murder for some minor or absurd point of doctrine. 
He loved to cite the cases of Father Vannini (judicially executed 
apparently for having won too many theological disputes) and 
the Calvinist, Jean Calais (superstitiously executed and his 
family dispersed, since he supposedly hanged his own son to 
prevent him becoming Catholic). It is significant that these 
critics focus on these (argument-suitable) cases like Vannini, 
Calais, Servet, Bruno and others. Admittedly, though, these 
were not the only cases – remember the witch hunts. Voltaire 
himself had to spend time in the Bastille for having stepped on, 
or satirized, sore corns – but: he developed a methodological 
prejudice of prejudiced methodology for a sustained attack on 
Christianity.
4.1  Freedom of opinion and expression
In On liberty of the press he argues that it had not been Luther, 
Calvin or Zwingli’s books that ruined the Catholic Church in half 
of Europe, but the fact that ‘these people and their adherents 
ran from town to town, from house to house, exciting women, 
and were maintained by princes’. Some dumb, ignorant, 
vehement Capuchin monk on foot ‘preaching, confessing, 
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communicating, caballing, will sooner overthrow a province 
than a hundred authors can enlighten it’. 
[5] It was not the Koran which caused Mahomet to succeed: it 
was Mahomet who caused the success of the Koran. 
No! Rome was not vanquished by books; it became so by having 
caused Europe to revolt against its rapacity; by the public sale 
of indulgences; for having insulted men, and wishing to govern 
them like domestic animals; for having abused its power to such 
an extent that it is astonishing a single village remains to it. 
Henry VIII, Elizabeth, the duke of Saxe, the landgrave of Hesse, 
the princes of Orange, the Condés and Colignys, have done all, 
and books nothing. Trumpets have never gained battles, nor 
caused any walls to fall except those of Jericho (1764: 1-2). 
Voltaire understood the issues of power involved here a bit 
better than did Dide-&-Dooms; also the way in which short 
term communication works. He also knew, given his own and 
his contemporaries’ fondness of Ancient ideas, that the pen 
(book) surely is mightier than the sword in the longer term: 
one has to teach the ‘Capuchin’ something and make sure his 
memory is supported by notes of some kind before sending 
him into the province. Importantly – and he ignores this - it 
is quite difficult to control the pen’s message, for unlike the 
sword it can be separated from its author and used (or abused) 
for unintended purposes. Yet he chose to ignore it all when it 
suited his methodological purposes. 
Roman Catholicism was Voltaire’s main target. In signing his 
letters with Ecrasez l’ Infame (‘Smash the Infamous’) he first 
and foremost had the Catholic Church in mind. (But he viewed 
all religious wars as barbarism, including fanatic Calvinist 
reactions to murderous attacks from Catholics.) 
4.2  Hermeneutics with an ideological twist
The issue of religious wars was crucial for developing a method 
to criticize Christianity: 
[6] I think the best way to fall on the infamous ... is to seem to 
have no wish to attack it; 
[1] to disentangle a little chaos of antiquity; -
[2] to try to make these things rather interesting: -
[3] to make ancient history as agreeable as possible; -
[4] to show how much we have been misled in all things; -
[5] to demonstrate how much is modern in all things thought 
to be ancient, -
[6] and how ridiculous are many things alleged to be respectable; 
and to let the reader draw his own conclusions (Herrich, 
1985, quoted from the larger Dictionnaire philosophique). 
Although a ‘political’ ploy, Voltaire propagated this as a 
scholarly method (Neo-Classicism), to enlighten the people 
against the dark ness of religion - a subversive Neo-Classicism 
as method. 
As a scholar he consistently practised all 6 points of this 
methodology in an integrated way – one has but to read through 
the ‘pocket-size’ Dictionnaire philosophique portatif to see this 
in action. He appears ideological: methodologically taking the 
position that the end justifies the means (as did Machiavelli before 
him and William James later). This (supposedly) was admissible 
where it concerned the infamous Catholic Church: mislead the 
reader a bit by ‘disentangling chaos’ in the Ancient sources and 
make them agreeable by presenting their ‘Modernity’. This means: 
consciously suppressing the worst aspects of Ancient practice 
and highlighting the worst aspects of the ‘infamous’. How did 
some predecessors fare?
• Bacon with his mixture of Christianity and utopian 
Humanism knew Ancient thought quite well, but did not 
give it complete social authority. 
• Descartes with his attempted totally new beginning 
ignored his own rootedness in it via the Scholasticism 
which he so despised, i.e. he copied from the Scholastic 
Christians without acknowledgement, while denigrating 
their work. 
• Vico set a Modern example of using original Ancient 
documents in a goal-directed way, but he did not use them 
as a means of targeting. He tried to show how God, in spite 
of all deviations of sinful humankind, still governs the 
world towards a better deal. 
• Voltaire provided Modernity with a techno-scientific mask, yet 
tried to find foundations in Classical ‘light’.
Historical facts would make me a liar if I tried to cover up 
institutional religion’s crimes, especially those of entrenched 
power cabals in its midst. These have been there for own 
advantage and would (and will) go to great lengths, even crime, 
to hold onto privilege. Arrogant and intolerant they were and 
still are. Voltaire rightly pointed this out. Also: he did not 
propagate violence, rather proposing tolerance in the form of 
allowing all ideas to compete, however despicable they might 
be. 
Yet judging by his own words and his activism in writing, he 
had the make-up, and fluid (quasi pragmatist), morality of an 
ideologue. This certainly contributed to the later uncontrollable 
gulf of Hobbesian elitism of the Revolutionaries: enforced 
secularism, an anti-religious attitude, bloodshed simply 
because people carried the wrong surnames, mass bloodshed 
in the name of a cause, and so forth. Liberal Voltaire lamented 
the bloodshed brought about by the Christians; some 150 years 
later Mussolini would similarly frown at secular Liberalism: 
‘Never has any religion claimed so cruel a sacrifice from its 
members’ (1938, II, 9; my bold). And we are still crying about 
the outcome of Modernity in the crimes of two World Wars. 
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As we can see in the cases of the Balkans, Israel, Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, North Korea, China, Zimbabwe, 
Ukraine: now in late-Mod ernity1 all wars are world wars: 
like burning coal mines the smoke columns on the surface 
are localized, but underground the burning tunnels are all 
connected in a Foucaultian war network. 
4.3  Enlightenment practicalism – method,  
 knowledge, power
Voltaire, like so many ‘enlightened’ writers of his time, 
was neither an anarchist nor an atheist. There was a direct 
connection between his religious views, his political stance, 
and his method of critique. 
He believed in enlightened monarchy - since Vico is seen as 
the very summit of historical en-lighten-ment (cf. Vico, 1984, 
SN, II, ix, 947 ff); Kant, Was ist Aufklärung, 2012: 60 ff). He thus 
maintained correspondence with Catherine the Great of Russia, 
and on and off with Frederick of Prussia. The fact that he had 
repeated fallouts with the latter (a critic, yet secret follower, of 
Machiavelli), at whose court he took refuge from the French 
monarchy, should have warned him 
• that ‘knowledge’ is not ‘wisdom’ and does not guarantee 
‘virtue’ – as Enlightenment practicalism believed (holding 
on to Socrates, Plato and Aristotle);
• that secular ‘enlightenment’ does not heal the dark side of 
having too much power; and might even be as dangerous 
as religious elitism, or pretended religious righteousness; 
• that possessing institutionalized power is not the same 
as believing in the foundational doctrines of the relevant 
institution. 
His very own methodological manipulations (quote [6]) 
should have indicated that the more the power, the greater the 
possibility of conceptual and practical manipulations. Doctrine 
often follows power - as rationalization or justification (as 
Mussolini actually admitted; cf. 1938: 1 ff)). 
4.4  Progress: from Nature as origin to Reason  
 as finality
Religiously Voltaire was a panto-deist trusting in ‘reason’. 
Through all of the Enlightenment some forms of the 
Ancient and Medieval doctrines of ‘natural law’ have all too 
often been presented (in a twisted form) as the Biblical idea 
of God’s law (providence) given in the human heart – the heart 
then presented as some sub-rational (instinctive or - at best - 
sentimental) proclivity (cf. Turgot, 1973: 71). Voltaire claimed 
that a violent atheist is more dangerous than a violent 
Christian, but he viewed a violent religious fanatic as much 
more dangerous than a morally paralysed philosophical atheist, 
such as the Roman senate in Cicero and Caesar’s days (1763: 8). 
Rational philosophy, even if atheist [supposedly], was safely 
tolerant – yet it was the adorers of reason who committed the 
most violent crimes during the first French Revolution some 
20-30 years later.
Since Machiavelli, Descartes and Hobbes, Modernity had been 
pestered by a serious difficulty. Onto-logically, its method was 
energized 
• on the one hand from its doctrine of the arché (its causa 
efficiens): reduced Nature,
• but on the other by its telos (causa finalis): Reason (or the 
Intellect controlling reason by Intuition). 
Intellect and Reason thus became the new supernatural. But after 
Hobbes the issue of ‘rationality’ had already become a serious 
concern. Hobbes presented the worst of the sub-rational (the 
instinctive striving for power, honour, and glory at any cost) 
as the natural state of being human. He located the ‘rational’ 
in the absolute, totalitarian state (allowing the individual only 
some quiet moments of rationality). This hidden irrational 
drive was adopted into all the serious philosophies of progress, 
as the motor moving history forward. Before the later Comte, 
Dilthey and Husserl, the issue of human life had widely been 
presented as survival against the odds of inter-individual 
human terrorism. 
Voltaire himself struggled to find a balance between the 
individual’s natural needs and his propagation of tolerance 
- see his hilarious inscription, ‘self-love’ (amour propre), in 
the Dictionnaire philosophique portatif. His arguments about 
freedom and tolerance concerned freedom of religion, 
expression, thought, i.e. the ‘higher’ freedoms. Regarding the 
sub-rational (survival) animosities among humans, the only 
antidote apparently available (until individual enlightenment 
at least had disclosed the social passions), was the rational civil 
state, whose task it was protect one citizen against the other 
(in Hobbes also against the other powerful institution: the 
Church). Anarchy was unaffordable. Yet, as Kant – two decades 
after Voltaire - succinctly formulated it: 
[7] The difficulty … is this: if he lives among others of his own 
species, man is an animal who needs a master. For he certainly 
abuses his freedom in relation to others of his own kind. And 
even though, as a rational creature, he desires a law to impose 
limits on the freedom of all, he is still misled by his self-seeking 
animal inclinations into exempting himself from the law where 
he can. He thus requires a master to break his self-will and force 
him to obey a universally valid will under which everyone can be 
free. But where is he to find such a master? Nowhere else but in 
the human species. But this master will also be an animal who 
needs a master. Thus while man may try as he will, it is hard to 
see how he can obtain for public justice a supreme authority in 
a single person or in a group of many persons selected for this 
purpose. For each one of them will always misuse his freedom if 
he does not have anyone above him to apply force to him as the 
laws should require it. Yet the highest authority has to be just in 
itself and yet also be a man. … a perfect solution is impossible. 
Nature only requires of us that we should approximate the idea 
(1975a: 46 – sixth proposition; translated by author).
Kant wrote these words in 1784, just more than four years before 
the French Revolution’s Declaration of the rights of the human 
and the citizen. His point is quite simple: regardless of whether 
Page 9 of 13
www.koersjournal.org.za dx.doi.org/10.19108/koers.80.3.2238
Original Research
we have a have a general will as law in a democratic format 
or in the form of enlightened monarchy, the ‘rational’ will 
always be undermined by the ‘animal’. A just sovereign needs 
to have Medieval divine characteristics, but speaking from a 
Humanistic perspective, still be a human being. Kant remained 
ambiguous here: in his 1786 essay Conjectures on the beginning of 
human history, a naturalist-deist, rationalist commentary of the 
Biblical Genesis, he makes nature (instinct) the voice of God, but 
also views the human being, as rational being, as elevated above 
nature to equality with the divine (1975b: 87 ff.). Thus he could 
argue for en-lighten-ment to be a self-educating, bottom-up 
process, while sustaining an enlightened monarchy as the best 
form of government. Finally his historicized ontology becomes 
governed by the rational idea as telos (to be approximated), 
under the causal control of the perpetual conflict processes 
of nature-seeking-equilibrium. Where have all the freedom-
flowers gone? 
Kant posed the dilemma of his day - a dilemma suppressed in 
Voltaire’s methodology. Voltaire trusted the scholarly elite to 
provide enlightenment through (correct) knowledge – thus 
publishing a pocket-sized Dictionnaire philosophique portatif 
(1764-5) as a more efficient enlightenment instrument than 
the voluminous (too materialist and atheist) Encyclopédie 
Française (edited by Diderot and D’Alembert). This Dictionnaire 
… is a world-and-life-view document intended for popular 
instruction, having many articles about Biblical figures, saints, 
and moral issues, and is slanted in favour of Greek and Roman 
Classics (versus Ancient Jews and Christians as well as Voltaire’s 
contemporary Christians). Ontologically it becomes a natural 
history extended into a human history. 
4.5  Neo-Classicism and method
The issue here remains method and scholarship. Scholarly 
methods are forms of (non-scholarly) power; they may become 
very powerful instruments beyond scholarship, for they could 
become the cultic parts of an ideologized belief in ‘science’. 
Voltaire, like almost every Enlightenment thinker, was a Neo-
Classicist. I have argued elsewhere that one finds two kinds of 
Classicism: 
Renaissance Classicism used the (Western) Classical Ancient 
(Greece and Rome) as sources of information, models and 
methods, while
Enlightenment Neo-Classicism used it as source of models, but 
derived its information and methods from Modern science (or 
at least pretended the latter). (Cf. further Venter, 2013c.)
Voltaire stretched the rules a bit: he wilfully polished the 
Ancient as models, making sure that the ‘infame’ appears in a 
very bad light next to it. His 1763 essay On toleration (a topic he 
repeatedly wrote about) is construed to show (i) that fanaticism 
reigns in credulous religion, but (ii) that philosophy, ‘the sister 
of religion’, enlightens and serves mildness: where philosophy 
reigned, in Ancient Greece and Rome, there were no religious 
persecutions. This essay encompasses most other writings of 
Voltaire on the topic; I shall more or less follow its argument 
in my analysis. 
He wrote the essay to beg the king to allow Huguenot exiles 
back into France, arguing that they posed no threat, asked no 
special favours, and would contribute to the social well-being of 
the country. Writing extensively on the outrages committed by 
Christian religion, he provides examples from Turkey, England, 
some American states, of the brotherhood of people of different 
religions. But he overstated his case: the supposed Islamic 
religious tolerance by Turkish rulers was obviously not true. 
This shows the ease with which he turned his own prejudices 
into ‘facts’.
4.6  Cleansing the Classics with ‘nature’ as  
 soap
However, his analyses of tolerance in Ancient times – both here 
and in his Dictionnaire (s v Athée, Athéïsme), are particularly 
slanted. He misconceived the relationship between religion 
and politics in an Ancient totalitarian state; he appears not 
to have wondered about the changes in divine hierarchies 
whenever one kingdom or empire overran another. Given the 
tribal total unity of cult, culture, politics, the economy, and 
so forth, all ancient wars were ‘religious’. Rousseau saw this: 
‘The political wars are also theological wars,’ he says (The social 
contract, IV, viii). This tribal conception of the divine and of 
society remained alive until quite late – it is still to be found in 
the specifically anti-Christian logician-cum-occultist Apuleias 
of Madaura (114-184 a. D.). Voltaire tends to ascribe events of 
religious persecution, such as the execution of Socrates, in 
terms of economic and power interests rather than religion. 
[8] A French writer, attempting to justify the massacre of St 
Bartholomew, quotes the war of the Phocaeans, known as the 
sacred war, as if this war had been inspired by cult, dogma, or 
theological argument. Nay, it was a question only of determining 
to whom a certain field belonged; it is the subject of all wars. 
Beards of corn are not a symbol of faith; no Greek town ever 
went to war for opinions. What, indeed, would this gentleman 
have? Would he have us enter upon a ‘sacred war’? (1763: 8). 3
The subject of every war is but a piece of land? Of course 
such an explanation is not entirely incorrect. Yet in its one-
sidedness it belies the fact that to have Socrates condemned, 
his accusers had to convince a large congregation of ‘judges’ 
of his ‘atheism’. In such a courtroom the accusation of atheism 
held water, since the said power and economic relationships 
were part of an original unity with other aspects of human life; 
importantly the cultic and the transfer of tradition (education). 
 
Voltaire himself characterized the execution of Socrates as 
the most odious event in the history of Ancient Greece (DPP, 
s.v. Athée). One also wonders why Voltaire did not see similar 
possibilities (economic interests) where Christians had been 
3  Note: Voltaire is upset with this French writer, defending the infamous 
(religiously inspired) slaughter of St Bartholomew on the basis of a 
Classical example. The Ancient Greeks and Romans could never have 
been so barbarous. Voltaire probably did not read Machiavelli: the 
latter’s Classicism was exactly a defence of Roman militarism and an 
attack on good Christian leaders for their meekness (cf. Venter, 2013c: 
14ff.). Voltaire reduces all Ancient wars to but economic issues. 
Page 10 of 13
www.koersjournal.org.za dx.doi.org/10.19108/koers.80.3.2238
Original Research
involved in religious wars: why absolve pagans in this manner, 
but not Christians? 
Machiavellian Classicism implied the very opposite of Voltaire’s 
view of the relationship between war and religion in Ancient 
times: Machiavelli praised exactly the Ancients’ fierceness 
and their (ab)use of religion for political ends. This could, 
hermeneutically, not work for Voltaire, who wanted to paint 
an opposite picture. Given his aims, he had to give a different 
explanation for Ancient bloodshed. The (quasi Hobbesian) 
natural inclinations of humankind provide easy explanations: 
jealousy, power mongering, fighting for food and land – but 
NEVER religion. His ontology provided him with a dialectical 
framework to explain the historical issues away, after the fact. 
Voltaire and Machiavelli followed similar selective methods: 
they just selected different data; or they read the selected 
data in a very slanted way. In his hermeneutics, Voltaire was 
as naturalistic as Machiavelli. But if nature controls culture 
everywhere; where is reason? 
In terms of Voltaire’s ontological framework, the early Christian 
persecution by the Roman Empire then had everything to do 
with inter-sectarian power mongering by the Jews; the Romans 
supposedly doing their best to protect Christians. Nero’s 
persecution was then solely based on a malicious lie: that 
Christians had burnt down Rome (1763: 8-9). Why then this lie?
Voltaire sensed the existence of counter-examples. Instead 
of seriously considering them as falsifiers of his theory, he 
continued his strategy of explaining them away by finding 
other reasons, or having the whole context displaced by a 
partial (correct ‘as such’) reason. The history of the martyrs was 
simply too overwhelming to ignore, thus:
[9] There were Christian martyrs in later years. It is very 
difficult to discover the precise grounds on which they were 
condemned; but I venture to think that none of them were 
put death on religious grounds under the early emperors. 
All religions were tolerated ... Titus, Trajan, the Antonines 
and Decius were not barbarians. How can they suppose that 
they deprived the Christians alone of a liberty which the 
whole empire enjoyed? How could they venture to charge the 
Christians with their secret mysteries when the mysteries of 
Isis, Mithra, and the Syrian goddess, all alien to the Roman cult, 
were freely permitted? There must have been other reasons for 
persecution. Possibly certain special animosities, supported by 
reasons of state, led to the shedding of Christian blood (1763: 9).
Having de-contextualized the events, Voltaire could re-
contextualize them in his own way. He refers to actions of 
Christians provoking persecution; actions of Protestants 
(such as Farel) who supposedly ‘deserved the death which he 
managed to evade by flight’ (1763: 9). Though in other contexts 
he blames the crimes of the Roman Catholic hierarchy for the 
spread of Protestantism, suddenly here the great preacher 
of tolerance judges a mild act of resistance (compared to the 
violent oppression that provoked it), as deserving death?
 
 
4.7  Caesarism: ‘reason of state’
Voltaire keeps quiet about a deeply religious reason for the 
resistance of early Christians: Caesarism. Caesarism – probably 
inherited from Egyptian Pharaoism - viewed the head of state 
or the sovereign as a ruling god. The sovereign may be, as Kant 
said (quote [7]) a democratically elected one or a hereditary 
monarch. Voltaire discursively recognizes the issue but hides it 
behind the abstraction, ‘possibly certain animosities, supported 
by reasons of state’ (quote [9]). ‘Reason of state’, since Hobbes, 
meant no more than the policies and actions of a holistic, 
totalitarian, absolute (i.e. ‘divine’) state, as moderator of the 
basic animosities among individuals and ‘civil’ institutions (cf. 
Venter, 1996:175 ff.). 
Furthermore, in a polytheistic society, one divinity more, or one 
less, makes little difference to everyday life. But a religion that 
recognizes only a single god, different from everything else and 
upon which everything else depends, could not accept another 
human being as god; not even pragmatically for the sake of 
‘reasons of state’. ‘Reason of the state-as-god’ could, among 
Christians, never be an argument for unqualified obedience. In 
the 18th century context of quasi-cultic secret societies (Voltaire 
himself belonged to an exclusive rationalist pagan ‘Temple’,  a 
Graeco-Roman kind of denominational ecumenism developed 
while sustaining the adoration of the civil state as (higher) 
reason (Hobbes: ‘Leviathan’ is the earthly God’; cf. 1946: II, 17). 
Voltaire, accepting abstract, empty ‘reasons of state’ as 
‘explanation’ of judicial violence, could thus not see a religious 
factor in martyrdom (in fact mass murder). He twisted his 
method into a dialectic: while pleading for religious tolerance 
on the basis of the common good, he denies that a Classical 
absolute state could itself become a ‘jealous god’. 
4.8  Civil religion and nationalism
Voltaire’s contemporary with whom he corresponded, 
Rousseau, fellow Neo-Classicist and fellow proponent of 
religious tolerance, in Du contrat social (IV, viii) prescribes 
capital punishment for only one offence: not adhering to the 
god the state adheres to (in the words of Socrates’ accusers). 
Rousseau’s problem with Christians was that if they were not 
coerced into signing the state’s ‘Masonic’ confession, they 
would become a divisive factor; anti-patriotic or weaklings 
uncaring for the fatherland. The ‘general will’ had to force 
citizens to be free, that is, into obedience of the ‘general will’. 
Rousseau’s patriotism was/ is no less intolerant than any other 
form idolatry. 
Voltaire could surely have noted the implicit intolerance of a 
Rationalist, ecumenist, civil religion in his direct environment, 
even though he was nearer to Lockean liberalism than to 
Rousseau’s socialism. He methodically overlooked the clear 
facts of Ancient and contemporary history, simply because he 
had pre-purified his ‘facts’ of any religious significance. 
The Civil constitution of the clergy of the French Revolutionary 
parliament, a few decades later, followed Voltaire’s and 
Rousseau’s ecumenist ‘(in)tolerance’. This law limited all 
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religious authority to the political boundaries (national 
and local), and also subjected officials of the dominant 
(Roman Catholic) Church to the civil authorities within these 
boundaries. They were not allowed to appear in public with 
noticeable indications of their religion. All church officials had 
to be elected by vote, the (civil) citizens of the relevant region 
being the electorate, elections being organized and supervised 
by the civil authorities of the region. The clergy had to take an 
oath in terms of this ‘Constitution’:
[10] ‘… in the presence of municipal officers, of the people and 
the clericals, the oath to be loyal to the nation, the law and the 
king, and to support with all his power the constitution decreed 
by the National Assembly and accepted by the king (Civil 
constitution, Title II, article 23; cf. 2012: 2).
PLATE D 
Note the words singled out in the commemorative plate [D]: 
‘I swear to maintain with all my might the Constitution’. It is 
significant that specifically this article has been singled out 
for the clergy’s oath. It is the article that sets the state above the 
church in structure and management; it is the Ancient Roman and 
Greek idea of the relationship between religion and state; it is 
the Machiavellian one; it is the Hobbesian one.
At this stage of the Revolution the pope was still recognized 
as the leader of doctrine; but the Deist ‘Supreme Being’ of 
Thomas More and Rousseau had already been introduced in the 
Déclaration des droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen of 1789. Somewhat 
later Robespierre would act as ‘Supreme Pontiff’ to introduce 
its cult during a reign of terror seldom seen. Monseigneur 
Boisgelin, the archbishop of Aix, noted in response that ‘Jesus-
Christ gave his apostles and their successors the mission 
for the salvation of the faithful; He did not give this, neither 
to the magistrates nor to the king’ (Hocking, 2014:94 ff.). 
Boisgelin, being Catholic, may have reduced Christianity to the 
institutional church, but he did see correctly that Christianity 
could not simply adopt the kind of religion prescribed by the 
state, i.e. a pagan kind of totalitarianism. 
Voltaire, blindfolding himself to the dangers of statism and 
Caesarism and naturalistically arguing away all semblance 
of a deification of something ‘this-worldly’ (with its violent 
religious consequences) –while on the one hand struggling for 
liberty of religion, opinion, the press, precisely this man, on the 
other hand, became so obsessed with the wrongs of some that 
he could no longer fathom the basis of such wrongs, present 
also in those he admired. This is revolutionary historiography; 
history rewritten to suit an ideological purpose. 
He may not have advocated an absolute and totalitarian state as 
such; but he appears to have accepted a tolerant, enlightened, 
totalitarian state, based upon the belief in education by 
scientific enlightenment. He too easily explained all of non-
deist religion as primitive credulity. In his Newton frontispiece 
(Plate C below), Classical symbols of power are Modernised into 
symbols of scientific enlightenment. 
Today he would surely have been labelled an Anti-Semite 
and Islamophobe (see his inscription s v Abraham in the 
Dictionnaire … portatif), as a racist and a cultural racist, and as a 
homophobe (to a certain extent). The symbolism of power plus 
intellect would recur in all fierceness and maximally intolerant 
during the Revolution (the fasces and the spears are presented 
together with Philosophy in Revolutionary emblems and 
symbols). Yet present-day critiques of Christianity often sound 
like that of Voltaire and Rousseau. 
5 REVIEW AND PERSPECTIVE
In 1769 Voltaire wrote his own essay on a theme that resurfaced 
from time to time since the letters of Cristin de Pizan in the 14th 
century: that of universal peace or even ‘eternal peace’. Cristin 
de Pizan was motivated by her Christian faith. The Abbot of 
Saint-Pierre also propagated this: in fact he believed that one 
could convince the nations of Europe that it is in every nation’s 
self-interest to punish any instigator of war; he proposed a 
kind of European government to ensure control. In 1796 Kant, 
though rejecting both Saint-Pierre’s and Rousseau’s versions 
of the project of universal peace, shows echoes of this in his 
argument that finally a covenant of nations will exert such 
control. This, however, would come about as the outcome of 
conflict and competition: the final balance of powers (cf. further 
Zum ewigen Frieden, 1975: 193 ff).
Voltaire ridiculed this. He argued that controlling war was not 
the answer – rather he quietly followed Locke in propagating 
toleration. Locke – in his Essay on toleration (1666) had no such 
universal political consequences in mind; he simply argued 
that it was unchristian and irrational to persecute somebody 
for his faith. In Voltaire’s essay, Pour la paix perpetuelle, par le 
docteur Goodheart, traduction de M Chambon (1769) he still 
insists that it is Christian intolerance – inherited from the Jews, 
who inherited it from the Egyptians – that causes injustice. 
Wherever there is a priest, there is intolerance, murder, and 
war (see Pour la paix perpetuelle, paragraphs V ff.). Machiavelli 
had already argued that wherever the Pope goes, there is 
division in the state; Rousseau said something similar. Both 
therefore looked to the Classics, and decided (as did Hobbes) 
that state control over religion was necessary. However, they 
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did not specifically have intolerance about doctrine in mind: 
they rather saw the conflicts and divisions as parts of power 
struggles. Voltaire was quite specific: the Christians have their 
origin in Jewish sectarianism and they thrive on doctrinal wars. 
Voltaire, for all his fame as a proponent of tolerance, became 
a useful tool for intolerance against all religion, especially 
Christianity. His claims against Christianity, together with 
especially those of Rousseau, were those on which the attacks 
on the Catholic Church in France were based during the French 
Revolution. Though he was often correct in his assessment 
of the state of Christianity at the time, his hermeneutic was 
specifically twisted to show how tolerant of doctrine the 
Classical era had been and how intolerant Christianity had 
always been; his respect for historical truth was seriously 
compromised by this. 
Of course this compromises his type of Caesarism – the 
enlightened totalitarian monarchy as legacy from the Modern 
side of Vico’s thought. But it also severely compromises his own 
doctrine of enlightened tolerance by education and civilisation. 
His twisted hermeneutics produced seriously twisted doctrinal 
positions: the combination of ‘scientism’ and ‘naturalism’, as is 
clearly visible in the Dide-and-Booms book referred to above. 
I could have cited many present-day de-contextualised quotes 
from Voltaire going the same direction as Dide-and-Booms. But 
the book is significant for its pretence to responsible science as 
propaganda, and for its deep dialectic between freedom and 
natural law. This dialectic is clearly present in Voltaire. It is the 
consequence of the Modern ambiguity about ‘natural law’ on 
the one hand, and of the Cartesian-Lockean reduction of good 
science to the procedures of natural science. 
What Voltaire did was to create tolerance by intolerantly 
undermining the ‘infamous’ using a dishonest hermeneutic 
bordering on fanaticism, and on the other to undermine 
the superstitions created by religion through en-lighten-ing 
the public. But again his approach to religion, the Bible and 
superstition was driven by his twisted interpretation theory. Not 
for one moment did he think of the explanations of Machiavelli 
and Hobbes, namely power-mongering. 
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